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Introduction 
Counter-intuitively, religion has been understudied as well as undervalued as a 
factor of foreign policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
1
 This emerges, for 
instance, from a prevalent dichotomy that contrasts ideology and pragmatism as 
core foreign policy orientations in the Islamic state,
2
 and the conviction stemming 
from it that at least since Ayatollah Khomeini’s demise in 1989, the latter course 
reigns supreme.
3
 The duality of ‘ideological’ and ‘pragmatic’ in these analyses is 
often construed on a par with that of radical and moderated policy—the latter 
associated initially with ᶜAli Akbar Hāshemi-Rafsanjāni’s speakership of 
parliament in the mid-1980s—and also frequently portrayed as coterminous with 
more and less religious views.
4
 The passing from ideological radicalism to 
pragmatic moderation is thus seen as illustrative of the larger secularising 
development of the Islamic Republic, a thesis that has been undeterred by the 
neoconservative reversal of 2005-2013.
5
 
Each of these terms, however, and each of the observed currents, is 
problematic when seen as an evolutionary stage rather than merely as a reversible 
tendency. It is not obvious, for instance, how radical policy and inflexible 
ideology might both be implied   in cases such as that in which ‘the Zionist 
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construct’ became a key supplier of ‘arms and medicine during the Iran–Iraq war, 
and a buyer of Iranian oil – with the knowledge of the revolutionary leader’.6 
Such ‘pragmatic radicalism’ on the part of the Iranian state crosscuts the above-
mentioned distinctions, as does the relative label ‘ideological-moderate’ that 
applies to significant parts of the presidency of Mohammad Khātami (1997–
2005). 
More important for the present discussion, religion tends not to crosscut but 
overlap with the various policy types. Religion has often fed into both ideology 
and radicalism in Iran’s foreign relations since the revolution—although Aboᵓl-
Hasan Bani-Sadr’s presidency in 1980–1981, among other cases evinced secular 
layers to radical ideology—but religion is equally central to policy that counts as 
moderate or pragmatic. Indeed, cooler concerns for external efficacy in the state, 
being more about means than ends, need not be inspired less by religious views 
than badges stuck on the lapel. The pragmatic approach was set in motion through 
Khomeini’s speech in October 1984, which stipulated that ‘(w)e should act as 
(…) in early Islam when the Prophet (…) sent ambassadors to all parts of the 
world to establish proper relations (…). We should have relations with all 
governments with the exception of a few’.7 
The conceptual problems that emerge from these homological sets—of 
ideological:pragmatic::radical:moderate—and their secularising assumptions 
indicate a failure to conceive of foreign policy in the Islamic Republic as 
expressing a fundamentally religious system. Whether in its constitutive 
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discourse, its institutional structures or inter- and transnational alliance behaviour, 
Iran’s foreign policy belies the ‘false secularity’ undergirding the Westphalian 
concept of interstate order.
8
 It may be against this background of misread 
secularity that international relations have for so long cut religion out as a factor 
for analysis,
9
 and one may similarly find a reason here for the stated neglect of 
religious ideology as a constitutive force of foreign policy in Iran. 
In Michael Freeden’s morphological analysis, ideologies consolidate through 
conceptual interrelation.
10
 There often are hierarchical aspects to such 
consolidation, as in the ranking of core, adjacent and peripheral concepts.
11
 
Furthermore, hierarchy may also occur across opposed variants within an 
ideological family, through the ‘encompassment of the contrary’ cementing the 
whole—the Dumontian insight into ideological integration.12  
Shiite Islamism within the Islamist ideological family
13
 includes core concepts 
such as Islamic rule, justice and divine sovereignty. Their association with 
adjacent concepts such as ‘the guardianship of the jurisconsult’ and Shiᶜa 
empowerment anchor the ideology in clericalist and lay variants. More 
ephemeral, peripheral concepts such as revolutionary export and ‘mother of the 
cities’ specify these general frames as outward and inward foreign policy 
orientations, respectively. In the same vein, the sectarian and ecumenist key 
variants of Shiite Islamism are particularised at the ideological perimeter by their 
embodiment in institutions such as the Majmaᶜ-e ahl-e beyt and the Majmaᶜ-e 
taqrib—see below. 
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The following explores ecumenism—seeking commonality or integration 
among Islamic Schools (mazāheb)—and sectarianism—promoting Shiism as a 
separate Islamic identity—as policy moulds in Iran in the revolutionary decade 
(1979–1989), the reformist interlude (1989–2005) and the period of radical 
reassertion (2005–2013). The analysis aims to isolate core tendencies in each of 
these eras from the complexities of the Islamic Republic’s historical record. The 
first epoch saw ecumenism foregrounded ideologically in Islamic universalism—
aimed at the global reign of Islam—and diluted in sectarian organisation. The 
second period contained pan-Islamism—for the political unification of Muslim 
lands—within religious nationalism, while transnational religious organisations 
integrated sectarian and ecumenical first principles. The third era was 
characterised by the dissonance of a reasserted ecumenism and the emergence of 
an explicit, strong sectarianism.  
In each of these cases, particular balances of ecumenism and sectarianism 
obtained. Core instances of ecumenism have been encompassed within 
frameworks of sectarian leadership, alliances and organisation, while an 
ecumenised Shiism has been at the basis of sectarian policy orientations. One sees 
examples in these cases of hierarchical totalisation through the encompassing of 
opposed ideological variants. In other words, the alternation of fore- and 
background in these policy orientations, of more inclusive and more sectarian 
paradigms, always articulates ecumenised but unmistakably Shiite Islamism. 
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Khomeinist Universalism as a Shiite Project 
The universalist themes in Khomeinist ideology, especially that of ‘export of 
the revolution’ (sodur-e enqelāb), are well established and mostly seen as 
contrasting with sectarianism.
14
 Among its eye-catching articulations were 
protestation and propaganda in the name of the ‘oppressed’ during the hajj, a 
setting that Khomeini had desectarianised through a fatwa in September 1979 
allowing Iranian Shiites ‘to pray behind a Sunni imam in Mecca and Medina’.15 
Iran’s Constitution of December 1979 held it to be the duty of the Islamic 
Republic to engender and further the unity of the Islamic world.
16
  
Khomeinist revolutionary discourse presented a politically sharpened unitary 
vision of the faith, over and above the fact that citing sectarian differences had 
long been ‘regarded by many Shi'is as an attempt to isolate them and even as part 
of an imperialist plot to foment division in Islam’.17 However, it is equally 
remarkable that Khomeinism’s ‘universal call (was) based on the particularities of 
Shi'i Islam’.18 
This paradox of universalism was enshrined in the Constitution’s Article 12, 
which was ecumenist in recognising the Sunni and Zaidi schools, but also 
proclaimed Twelver Shiism the religion of state and president—inviting protest 
from foreign Sunni Islamists sympathetic to ecumenism
19
 and hampering Iran’s 
claim to the patronage of global revolution (Article 154). Moreover, the 
universalist revolutionary export had Shiite particularist frames that were visible 
principally in two aspects of foreign policy: the core religious imaginary and 
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doctrine guiding the war with Iraq, serving both its justification and the 
mobilisation of the populace,
20
 and the sectarian inscription of Iran’s foreign 
alliances. 
Dichotomous terms central to the Iranian leaders’ ideology, such as ‘belief’ 
(imān)/Islam and ‘unbelief’ (kofr), ‘disinherited’ (mostazᶜafun) and ‘arrogant’ 
(mostakbarun), and ‘truth’ (haqq) and ‘falsehood’ (bātel)—the last two being 
terms in which Hoseyn’s battle at Karbalāᵓ had also been couched—served from 
the outset as an overarching ideological frame. From early on, it was ‘part of the 
justification of the war’ to export the revolution to Iraq and establish an Islamic 
government.
21
 Iran’s President since October 1981, ᶜAli Hoseyni Khāmeneᵓī 
stated in March 1982 that the outcome of the war should be not only that Iraq 
would be an Islamic state, but also that it would be ruled under the principle of 
velāyat-e faqih and Khomeini’s leadership.22 More broadly, Iraq ‘would be 
absorbed into Iran or administered as an independent—vassal—Shi'i state (while 
the Persian) Gulf States were expected to sue for peace and line up to await their 
conversion into Islamic republics’.23 
The sectarianism of Iran’s revolutionary export was reinforced by its foreign 
alliances. The view is now often shared that most ‘armed groups that received 
support from Iran during the 1980s were Shi'i’.24 Similarly, the revolution was 
often carried abroad through Iran’s foreign Shiite clients, regardless of the 
competition that might also define their relations.
25
 Revolutionary export first 
reached contiguous or nearby territory where Shiite majorities experienced 
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disenfranchisement—Iraq and Bahrain—and, at a later stage, a territory where 
Shiites formed the largest minority in a majority-less state—Lebanon.26 
The first foreign minister associated with the export of the revolution, Musavi, 
made headlines with pan-Islamic themes,
27
 but its primary vehicle was of a 
sectarian bent. The Council for the Islamic Revolution coordinated five regional 
subdivisions or (Supreme) Revolutionary Assemblies:
28
 of the Islamic Revolution 
in Iraq (SAIRI or SCIRI);
29
 of Lebanon (AIRL); of the Arabian Peninsula 
(OIRAP or AIRAP); of Africa and the Arabian Maghreb (SAIRAAM); and of 
Asia (SAIRA).
30
 The principal groupings, the first three, each saw central roles 
for Shiite personalities or parties: Hojjatoleslām Bāqer al-Hakim headed 
SAIRI/SCIRI, Islamic AMAL and Hezbollāh were central to AIRL, and 
OIRAP/AIRAP was reputedly led by Hojjatoleslām Mohammad-Taqi al-
Modarresi.
31
 
The most enduring alliance struck by the Islamic state, with Syria, was rooted 
in pre-revolutionary religio-political encounters, besides in common regional 
interest, and came to exemplify contradictions of its Islamic universalism. The 
fatwas of two revolutionary clerics, Hasan Mahdi al-Shirāzi and Musā Sadr, 
legitimising the ᶜAlawis as Twelver Shiites, ‘probably paved the way for future 
collaboration between the Alawis of Syria and the Shia represented by the (…) 
Islamic Republic’.32 After the Islamic revolution, the Damascene shrine complex 
of Sayyida Zaynab became a transnational hub of Twelver Shiism where Iran 
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constructed the second largest hawza, and the Syrian and Iranian regimes 
promoted ‘pilgrimage as a religious dimension of their strategic alliance’.33 
The earliest Iranian–Syrian meetings discussed support for the Iraqi 
opposition, especially in the Shiite South, and, in November 1979, for the Shiite 
opposition in Iraq, but Iran and Syria did not ‘seal’ their alliance until spring 
1982.
34
 Shortly before the arrival in Tehran of the Syrian Foreign Minister 
Khaddām, in late February 1982, Asad’s regime had concluded its destruction of 
Hama, quelling the Muslim Brotherhood’s uprising. Iran’s foreign minister, ᶜAli 
Akbar Velāyati, fiercely condemned the Muslim Brothers on 4 March, in a 
statement that evidenced the first major crack in the Islamic Republic’s 
universalist facade. This episode greatly damaged Iran’s ecumenist and pan-
Islamic credentials.
35
 
Iraq was the ‘primary target’ for revolutionary export, due especially to its 
contiguous territory harbouring a subject Shiite majority.
36
 The centrality of Iraq 
to the Islamic Republic’s foreign relations was further reflected in the exceptional 
political contributions to the Iranian state by Shiites from Iraq. In actions 
reminiscent of the Safavid era, when foreign ᶜolamā relocated to Iran to assist in 
the build-up of the religious state, the Islamic state incorporated several Iraq-born 
Shiites, who subsequently played key roles in the nezām and were often involved 
with revolutionary export. Key among these were Ayatollah Mahmud Hāshemi-
Shāhrudi, who among other sensitive functions was the head of Iran’s judiciary 
between 1999 and 2009, and Ayatollah Mohammad ᶜAli Taskhiri—see below.37  
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Just as support of the Iraqi Shiite opposition saw Syrian–Iranian coordination, 
mediation by the ᶜAlawite regime was crucial to the Islamic Republic’s incursions 
onto Lebanese soil. Both at the height and arguably a low point in Iran’s foreign 
reach in the 1980s, Iranian officials or their ideological partners abroad ventured 
views of Shiite land in Lebanon as part of the Iran-led, transnational Islamist 
state. December 1982 saw the proclamation at Baalbek of the Islamic Republic of 
Lebanon.
38
 Its draft constitution from 1985 held that ‘in the absence of the Hidden 
Imam, the source of all authority is the Virtuous Jurist […], who will appoint the 
chairman of the Lebanese Governance of the Jurist Commission, a local 
ayatollah’.39 Such transnational conceptions of the Shiite Islamist state remained 
long after ‘moderation’ had set in in Iran. Within months of the Taif accord of 
October 1989, which stipulated Syria’s retreat from Lebanon and the 
deconfessionalisation of its state, Iran’s ambassador to Syria, Mohammad-Hasan 
Akhtari, ‘stressed that Iranian officials regard Lebanon, especially the Islamic 
area of it, as part of the Islamic Republic’.40 
The Shiite articulation of Iran’s foreign ties was forthright in the case of 
several Gulf states—especially Bahrain and Kuwait—where revolutionary export 
was significantly shaped by Khomeini’s personal deputies, liaising with Shiite 
Islamist parties.
41
 Thus, the ‘Arab Gulf (became) an arena for Shiᶜi radicals of 
many outside nationalities—Iranian, Iraqi, and Lebanese’,42 and revolutionary 
export to Lebanon, Iraq and the Gulf became intermixed. Saudi Shiites were 
radicalised via these transnational—but especially through Mohammad-Taqi al-
Modarresi, Iraqi-dominated—networks43 and after the uprising in 
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November/December 1979, ‘the bulk of OIRAP’s leadership relocated to Iran.’ 
With their ‘Iraqi mentors’, they became champions of the Islamic Republic’s 
political model.
44
 
Significant ties to Afghan parties developed later than relations in the Levant 
and the Gulf. As in these areas, Iran supported specifically Shiite groups ‘rather 
than resistance organizations generally or even the Sunni Islamic fundamentalist 
groups’.45 However, this situation crystallised only gradually, on account of the 
initial lack of credible Shiite contenders to carry the torch of its revolution.
46
 The 
first organisation deemed worthy and a recipient of largesse was the Sāzmān-i 
Nasr-i Islāmi-yi Afghānistān. But in 1982, Iran’s discontent with its operations 
led to the launch of an Afghan branch of the Islamic Republic’s Pāsdārān.47 After 
the Soviet retreat in 1989, ‘Iran decided to unite all the Shi’a components’ and to 
that end created and supported Hizb-i Wahdat in the central Hazarajat area.
48
 
In South Asia, the Islamic revolution left the most visible traces in Pakistan. 
Exceptionally, Iran’s direct investment in Shiite communities in the region 
followed botched efforts to reach out to Sunni Islamist parties.
49
 Key 
organisational bonds with Pakistani Shiites had, however, been welded in the 
aftermath of the revolution.
50
 Through Iran’s transnational Shiite missionaries, 
such as the AMAL-trained Revolutionary Guard commander Mohsen Zamāni, the 
Imāmia Student Organization was resurrected.51 The Tahrik-i Nifāz-i Fiqh-i 
Jaᶜfariya was led from 1984 by ᶜAllāma ᶜĀrif Huseyni (d. 1988), who acted from 
1985 as Khomeini’s wakil in Pakistan52 and turned the movement ‘into a militant 
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body (aspiring to) Islamic revolution—modelled after that of Iran and following 
Khomeini’s authority’.53 
The Islamic Republic showed ‘persistence’ in its ‘revolutionary foreign 
policy’ in the 1990s,54 but in the Gulf, the pattern of popular demonstrations, 
violent confrontations and acts of terrorism had largely subsided by the mid-
1980s. Iran’s acceptance of UN Resolution 589 and the cease-fire with Iraq of 
July 1988 are sometimes seen as marking ‘the failure of the Iranian attempt to 
export its revolution by military means’.55 With the Liberation Movements 
Bureau closed, its leader Hāshemi executed and ‘subcontracting’ Shirāziyyin 
under pressure, revolutionary export was recast in a more conventional role, as 
means of extending the national state interest first and foremost, as opposed to 
global Islam
56—although views of the Iranian state interest were still mediated by 
Shiite national identity. 
 
Inversions of Ecumenism and Sectarianism 
Iran’s mission towards the Islamic world continued, for instance, via two pan-
Shiite and ecumenist organisations. In April 1990, a ‘World Conference on the 
People of the Prophet’s House’ in Tehran announced the creation of two 
international bodies with apparently clashing ecumenist and sectarian remits: the 
World Society for Rapprochement between the Islamic Sects and the World 
Society for the People of the Prophet’s House57—hereafter, in abridged Persian 
form, Majmaᶜ-e taqrib and Majmaᶜ-e ahl-e beyt. 
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The Majmaᶜ-e Taqrib was established in October 1990 and presented as an 
important regime institution.
58
 A perceptive reflexion holds that the Majmaᶜ 
aimed to reduce Iran’s isolation after 1979, especially from the Sunni-Arab world, 
while aspects of its organisation made this objective unlikely to succeed. These 
included ‘the predominance of the Shiis on (its) board (and the) total financial 
dependency on its founder and protector, Supreme leader Khāmeneᵓī, and his far-
reaching powers in filling its leading posts’.59 This observation of the Society in 
2001, of supreme Shiite oversight and sectarian directorship, still holds true of its 
modus operandi in the second decade of the 21st century.
60
 As revolutionary 
export often did in Khomeini’s era, ecumenical politics thereafter aimed to 
encompass Sunni–Shiite rapprochement within a religiously defined hierarchy of 
Shiite leadership.  
The Society’s latest démarche concerned the Arab Spring, which mostly 
involved ‘downtrodden Muslims’, according to its flagship journal Al-Taqrib 
(‘rapprochement’). The journal recalls that Khāmeneᵓi had called the uprisings an 
‘Islamic awakening’, and that all Islamic movements needed to identify with ‘the 
existing revival so as to be a part of it in an integral and authentic fashion’—i.e. 
subordinate themselves to Khāmeneᵓi’s leadership.61  
The issue of proper Islamic leadership is argued with reference to Imam ᶜAli’s 
letter to Mālik al-Ashtar, followed by a warning that the sectarian divide was the 
greatest stumbling block for its acceptance. Among several ways forward, the 
journal then points to the Ayatollah Javādi-Āmoli, who had suggested during a 
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feqh lesson in February 2011, while commenting on a prayer of the sixth Imam 
Jaᶜfar al-Sādeq, that the true meaning of the term ‘Shiites’ was not sectarian but 
should embrace all Muslims.
62
 Shiite leadership claims were supported by the 
case for a vanguard taqrib, in other words, that was already embodied within an 
ecumenical Shiism, readymade for the remainder of the umma to embrace. 
While energetically pursuing ecumenist objectives over the decades, 
organising international conferences and issuing a range of publications, the 
Majmaᶜ-e Taqrib has not tangibly brought about Sunni–Shiite rapprochement. 
The Sunni world outside Iran remains by and large unmoved by Iranian-led Shiite 
overtures, and it has been observed pertinently that ecumenism ‘remains an 
intellectual exercise, with almost no place in the intimate dialogue between Shi'i 
ulama and Shi'i believers’.63 In contrast, the second World Society, for the People 
of the Prophet’s House, would tap into deeper reservoirs.64 
The Majmaᶜ-e Ahl-e Beyt continued the apparent new trend of the Islamic 
Republic, despite ecumenist initiatives, of establishing foreign ties on an 
explicitly Shiite basis. From the early 1990s, for instance, Iranian activity aimed 
at Shiite conversion (estebsār) surfaced in the former Soviet Union.65 In April 
1989, a new Organization for Islamic Message Propagation had been founded, 
dedicated to ‘spreading Shiᶜa Islam’. The state body was overseen by Mohammad 
ᶜAli Taskhiri, who would also become the Society’s first director.66 
The main objective of the Majmaᶜ-e Ahl-e Beyt has been ‘to gain control over 
the political, social and religious affairs of the Shii communities throughout the 
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world (and) to centralise them under the leadership of the Iranian walī-ye faqīh 
ᶜAlī Khāmeneᵓī’.67 Thus, the Society has been unapologetic of its sectarian 
mission. It declared that it worked ‘for the international dissemination of the Shii 
fiqh whose superiority to that of the Sunnis it wishes to prove by peaceful 
propagandistic means’.68 Beyond the Islamic world, the Society intimated global 
ambitions. An article published on its news site under the current Head, Hasan 
Akhtari, claimed that the West was turning towards Islam and that Christianity’s 
natural affinity with the mazhab provided an opportunity to spread Shiism.
69
 
The emergence of the Majmaᶜ-e Ahl-e Beyt has been associated with the 
resurgence of a traditionalist Shiite stratum in Iran that was uncomfortable with 
the Ecumenical Society.
70
 Irrespective of its clear sectarian mission, however, it 
would be a misconception of the organisation to construe its sectarianism as being 
opposed to ecumenism. Its main objectives, such as ‘the establishment and 
strengthening of unity among all the sons of the Islamic umma’, are mostly stated 
in transsectarian language.
71
  
The fact that the Society’s remit extends beyond the sectarian divide is 
reflected also in its leadership. First, there has been significant staff overlap 
between the Majmaᶜ-e Ahl-e Beyt and the Majmaᶜ-e Taqrib. Taskhiri, currently a 
member of the Supreme Council of the Majmaᶜ-e Ahl-e Beyt, has served as 
Secretary-General to both societies; Arāki is a present member of the Supreme 
Council
72
 and Secretary-General of the Majmaᶜ-e Taqrib. Moreover, the current 
Secretary-General of the Majmaᶜ-e Ahl-e Beyt, Akhtari, while not having served 
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in the Majmaᶜ-e Taqrib, has an elaborate ‘universalist’ profile. Thus, one notes his 
insistence on Islamic unity and ‘gathering the sects together’.73 
Where the above-mentioned principles of the Majmaᶜ-e Ahl-e Beyt all ranked 
‘the followers of the Ahl-e Beyt’ alongside other members of the umma or 
subsumed the Shiites within it, the Shiites’ organisation harboured a different, 
hierarchical view on inter-sectarian relations. This hierarchical understanding 
emerged from Taskhiri’s insistence, as Secretary-General not of the Majmaᶜ-e 
Taqrib—whose practice his message echoed—but of the Majmaᶜ-e Ahl-e Beyt, 
‘that Iran’s Shi'is have a legitimate, historical right to exert political and 
intellectual-religious leadership over Muslims worldwide’.74 
In sum, ideological tension exists not only between but also within these two 
state organisations—revealing inversions of ecumenism and sectarianism. The 
Majmaᶜ-e Ahl-e Beyt couples a sectarian name and a Shiite world remit with 
largely universalist first principles, hosting a Secretary-General whose media 
presence has ecumenist overtones and a first leader avowing the Islamic umma, 
rather than the Shiite world only, as the field of application for Shiite leadership. 
The Majmaᶜ-e Taqrib, on the other hand, whose raison d’être is ecumenist 
rapprochement, maintains a largely sectarian Board and depends on funding and 
supervision at the apex of the Shiite state. Both Societies remain in the service of 
Shiite universalism, in, respectively, more ecumenist and sectarian articulations. 
They encompass Sunni rapprochement within religiously defined hierarchies of 
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Shiite leadership, and place ecumenical Shiite direction at the helm in the umma’s 
struggle.  
 
Religious Conceptions of Political Moderation 
Before Velāyati was appointed to lead the Majmaᶜ-e Ahl-e Beyt, he had been 
the Islamic Republic’s longest-serving foreign minister and was associated with 
the moderating turn in its foreign policy.
75
 By the mid-1980s, Velāyati and 
Speaker of Parliament Rafsanjāni were among the main advocates of a diluted 
take on revolutionary export and the principle of ‘neither East nor West’.76 They 
built on Khomeini’s inception of a pragmatic foreign policy, often thought to be 
on a par with moderation, in October 1984.
77
 Khomeini had modelled his course 
on the example of the Prophet, who had ‘sent ambassadors to all parts of the 
world to establish proper relations’.78 In November 1988, after the ceasefire with 
Iraq, Deputy Foreign Minister Beshārati signalled Iran’s desire for improved 
relations with Saudi Arabia, hitherto its Islamic nemesis, stating that ‘our holy 
shrines (…) and our Ka’ba are there. The Prophet is buried in Saudi Arabia. Can 
we ignore it?’79 
The reorientation towards state interests and limited nationalism, especially 
after Khomeini’s death, is sometimes conceived as a secularisation of the Islamic 
Republic.
80
 Key foreign policy statements, however, revealed religious 
nationalism. While the religious quality of the ‘Islamic nation’ remained—by 
definition—transnational, the political articulation that became more pronounced 
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prioritised it for Iranians within the state borders. Ideologically, this ‘still 
allow(ed) Iran to serve as the nucleus for a large Islamic order. But in the pursuit 
of such an order’ it had ‘to operate within the constraints of realpolitik’.81 
Religious nationalism became explicitly a corrective to pan-Islamist foreign 
policy.
82
 Central to this development was Mohammad-Javād Lārijāni’s new gloss 
on the Qurᵓānic concept of omm ol-qorā, or ‘mother of the cities’, which 
‘acquired broader currency’ under Rafsanjani’s presidency.83 The theory 
‘prioritises national capacity building at the expense of (…) revolutionary action 
in the external sphere’ and ‘positions Iran at the centre of the Islamic world, on 
account of (its) Islamic and revolutionary credentials’. Indeed, the concept 
‘cautions against the policy of (bast) or expansion (i.e. revolutionary export), 
calling instead for the consolidation of resources (…) within Iranian borders’.84 
Religious nationalism was not in principle at odds with Islamic universalism, 
but reprioritised Shiite Iran tactically. In the event of a conflict between omm ol-
qorā and revolutionary export, Lārijāni declared, the ‘protection of (the former) 
should be preferred’.85 Concurrently, omm ol-qorā ‘equates the defence of Iran to 
the wider defence of Islam’86 and might also be read within ‘the radical rhetoric 
of the Islamic revolution’. According to this theory, said Lārijāni, both 
revolutionary export and defence of the ummah ‘as a unified community (wāhida) 
(are) engrained in the prestige of the Mother of Cities’.87 
It may seem plausible at first sight that ‘(s)tripped of its ideological content, 
this concept [of omm ol-qorā] was a thinly disguised attempt to inject nationalism 
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(…) in(to) the country’s ill-defined foreign policy doctrine’.88 However, in its 
appeal not to ethnic or civilisational markers but to Iran’s Shiite-Islamic nation on 
a transnational mission, omm ol-qorā theory implies a specific, indelible religio-
geographical identity. This emerges for instance in Resālat newspaper’s rendering 
of the theory, which states that ‘velāyat-e faqih and (its) government (…) are the 
basis (for) the foundation of Islamic republics in the omm ol-ghorā. The agent of 
Islamic unity is that same leadership of velāyat-e faqih’.89 
Besides (religious) nationalism, trans- and internationalist orientations 
remained important to Iranian policy, both in rhetoric and in practice, in the 
moderating intervals from 1989 to 2005.
90
 On the one hand, radical 
transnationalists repeatedly subverted reformist foreign policy under Rafsanjāni 
and Khātami, as they had in the ‘left-liberal’ era.91 On the other hand, state 
leaders themselves kept to religious internationalist views. Thus, after ‘direct 
export of the revolution was abandoned in the 1990s, foreign policy was to 
maintain an active idealistic presence in the world’.92 
The new expediency led to remarkable quietism toward some Shiites abroad, 
as during the sectarian uprising in Iraq in 1991, Khāmeneᵓi’s judgement being 
that intervention was ‘not recommended’;93 the massacre of Hazaras in 
Afghanistan in 1997 and 1998;
94
 and the brutalisation of Bahraini Shiites from 
2011.
95
 Following détente, the policy of Shiite mobilisation in the Persian Gulf 
was officially abandoned under Khātami. If ‘the Shiite factor’ became ‘of less 
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importance’ in Iran–Gulf relations,96 however, the Islamic Republic was far from 
cutting foreign Shiism loose, let alone abandoning its broader Islamic mission. 
Contrary to the theorised ‘self-secularization of the faqih-headed revolutionary 
Islamic state’ in post-Khomeini Iran,97 based on the distancing of the religious 
state and presumed inert traditional religion, Khātami’s ideology was steeped in 
Shiism’s dynamic modernist reworking.98 The larger foreign policy frames under 
Khātami, too, reflected evolving, politically appropriated religious ideology.99 
Although Iran had discontinued some ‘of the confrontationist policies (…) of the 
first decade of the revolution’, for instance, ‘tabligh and dawat continue(d) to 
provide (…) strategic means to realize the preferences of the state’.100 Besides 
coercion, ‘propagation’ and ‘invitation’ had been part of the repertoire of Iran’s 
revolutionary export since 1979,
101
 but they also concerned ‘traditional’ 
proselytisation and could be traced in political usage from the Safavid ascent 
onward.
102
 
During Khātami’s presidency, the ideological constancy under strategic flux 
emerges for instance from an interview in 2003 given by the chairman of the 
Expediency Council, which ‘designs [Iran’s] Grand Strategy’ and ‘proposes 
guidelines for foreign policy’.103 Rafsanjāni confirmed the line of his own 
presidency, valuing national independence over fighting oppression. The new 
emphasis remained within the bounds of ‘Islamic values’, however; the political 
horizons remained unchanged. Islam’s transformation into a ‘predominant world 
power’ (qodrat-e mosallat-e jahāni) was now reframed as a long-term aim.104  
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Rafsanjāni also voiced continued sectarian partiality in foreign relations, 
challenging the portrayal of Iran’s policy since the late 1990s as ‘confessionally 
neutral’.105 With the current democratic trend in the world, he felt, there was 
reason for optimism among Shiites in Shiite majority countries, who would 
become rulers. As for Shiites in minority situations, ‘(t)he world accepts that we, 
as a Shiite country, help Shiites in other places’.106 
 
Ecumenism and Sectarianism in Collision 
Two tendencies mark analyses of ecumenism and sectarianism in Iran’s 
foreign policy since Khomeini’s demise in general and Ahmadinezhād’s 
presidency (2005–2013) in particular. One emphasises transsectarian outreach, 
for instance, as rooted in Khomeinist universalism and to counter sectarian 
isolation,
107
 or in non-sectarian motives to Iran’s Shiite ties abroad.108 
Correspondingly, Iran’s Supreme Leader has strongly advocated ecumenist 
universalism, opposing sectarianism, and his stance became more pronounced 
under Ahmadinezhād from August 2005 (see below). Besides the Leader, the 
government was seen to be ‘(a)nimated by the same ecumenical spirit (as it) tried 
to build a bridge between Shiᶜa and Sunni believers by organizing inter-faith 
gatherings in Iran’.109 
The second perspective highlights sectarian anchors, claiming, for instance, 
that the retrenchment to the Shiite realm resulted from the failure of attempts at 
revolutionary export beyond it. Early Sunni enthusiasts for Khomeinist 
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internationalism were often alienated when they realised that Shiite leadership 
was central, both theologically and organisationally, to the outwardly 
transsectarian project.
110
 Another argument, associating the return of sectarianism 
with Ahmadinezhād’s presidency, holds that Iran’s foreign policy had universalist 
guises for sectarian motives.
111
 In contrast with the reading of Iran’s ‘resistance’ 
agenda in terms of transsectarian aims, its targeting of Israel and Washington 
across sectarian divides is here seen as a ploy to enhance Shiite Iranian power. 
Great power status would only be conceivable for Shiite Iran where Sunni 
resistance to the Shiᶜa revival could be rolled back.112  
The two seemingly conflicting valuations are complementary in the context of 
Ahmadinezhād’s presidency, which saw both ecumenist and sectarian attitudes 
come into sharper focus. The ninth and tenth governments stand out in the history 
of the Islamic Republic not only because of their president’s colourful 
personality, but also for the religio-political elevation of his function. 
Ahmadinezhād’s mentor, the Ayatollah Mesbāh-Yazdi, held that ‘(w)hen the 
president receives his edict from the Guardian-Jurist(,) obedience to (the former) 
is the same as or on a par with obedience to God’.113 The budding conflict 
between presidency (riāsat-e jomhuri) and leadership (rahbari) that arose from 
this reassessment, and Ahmadinezhād’s exploration of its limits, created new fault 
lines in Iran’s foreign policy, unravelling hierarchical integration in the balance of 
ecumenism and sectarianism. 
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Messianic Challenges to Clerisy 
Among mainstream (osuli) Shiism’s key dilemmas is the imposition of clerical 
authority on a religiosity of ‘expectation’ (entezār), and many have been its 
messianic challenges. In the Islamic state, messianism surfaced in the Anjoman-e 
hojjatiye, until the Society was dissolved in 1983,
114
 but it remained a social 
force. Under Khātami, according to the former state official Hajjāriyān, ‘nearly 
twenty messianic sects appeared’.115 This ‘proliferation’, moreover, ‘first served 
as a counterforce’ to reformism.116 Thus, Ahmadinezhād’s Mahdism did not come 
unannounced. Two aspects, however, made it intrinsically startling. First, on the 
state level, such Adventism had probably not occurred since the 14th century, 
under the Sarbadārs.117 Second, messianism emerged unexpectedly centre stage 
from under the Leader’s wing—irrespective of the esoterism in his Mashhadi 
background
118—and turned into a populist discourse with anti-clerical overtones, 
against him. 
Ahmadinezhād’s floating of messianic themes from the onset of his 
presidency, cloaking his reign in the Mahdi’s aura, proved to be deeply divisive. 
Among the prominent clergy who spoke out against Ahmadinezhād’s 
‘superstitious’ discourse during his first tenure were ᶜAbdolkarim Musavi-
Ardabili, Yusef Sāneᶜi and Nāser Makārem-Shirāzi.119 
Outside the government, within the state, Ahmadinezhād’s revolutionary 
Mahdism resonated, for instance, in the Guards’ affiliated ‘Centre for Strategic 
Studies and Doctrine of Security Without Borders’ (Markaz-e motāleᶜāt-e 
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estrātezhik va doktrin-e amniyat bedun-e marz), whose Head, Hasan ᶜAbbāsi, 
combined activist Mahdism with an apocalyptic stated belief in the imminence of 
a third world war.
120
 ᶜAbbāsi was considered a ‘principlist’ theoretician, even if 
the president himself fell from ᶜAbbāsi’s favour after he had embraced Mashāᵓi’s 
‘deviation’—see below—and kept the rahbar at bay.121 
In ᶜAbbāsi’s discussion of Mahdism and foreign policy, which, remarkably, 
was available on the presidential website in June 2013, active Mahdism implied 
preparation for the apparition. It held that Shiites’ striving had given rise to a 
Shiite state in the world—the Islamic Republic. Unlike Ahmadinezhād, ᶜAbbāsi 
made no effort to moderate sectarian reason by ecumenisation: Shiism had been 
transformed ‘from a secret (…) movement into an open front’ and was considered 
among ‘the players on the world stage.’ However, ‘the arrogant powers pull the 
world to the abyss of extinction and plunder (it) in a puppet show assembly 
named the (United) Nations.’ In this context, ‘the Shiite front, too, in laying the 
groundwork for Mahdism, has traversed geographical boundaries and erected a 
perimeter for itself that is named the border of belief and religious school 
(mazhab)’.122 
Another Shiite articulation of an Islamic perspective to Iran’s foreign policy 
was present from the outset in Ahmadinezhād’s government. This concerned the 
ideological foregrounding of the theme of ‘justice’ (ᶜadl), more than under his 
predecessors.
123
 ᶜAdl is more than a blurry third-worldist slogan, or an ecumenist 
topic; it is central to Shiism. The theme’s significance for the Iranian state under 
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Ahmadinezhād is shown in its self-representation as ‘the justice-centred 
government’ (dowlat-e ᶜadālat-mehvar).124 Furthermore, it is argued in a 
discourse analysis of the ninth and tenth governments—in a claim that brings out 
another core topos in Shiite thought, linking justice and the Imamate—that their 
‘justice-seeking principlism’ (osulgerāᵓi-ye ᶜadālat-khvāh) is based on velāyat.125 
During Ahmadinezhād’s second term in office, from August 2009, his ties 
with Khāmeneᵓi soon unravelled, in public. This was reportedly presaged by 
several incidents in the president’s first term, including the instance when ‘as 
Ahmadinejad was about to leave Ayatollah Khameneh’i’s office, he had quipped, 
“(Ayatollah Khameneh’i) thinks that I am his President, but I am the Twelfth 
Imam’s President”’.126 There had been other indications that Ahmadinezhād felt 
himself to be autonomously authorised religiously. In March 2008, his Chief of 
Cabinet had spoken of the era of the president as that of ‘the lesser advent’ 
(zohur-e soghrā)—of the Twelfth Imam—while Ahmadinezhād claimed in May 
that his government worked under the Mahdi’s ‘management’ (modiriyat).127 
The public decline in the relationship between the Islamic Republic’s two 
main representatives pivoted in particular on the president’s patronage of his in-
law, the iconoclast Esfandiyār Rahim Mashāᵓi, in prestigious functions including 
the vice-presidency. Together, on account of a speech by Mashāᵓi in August 2010, 
Ahmadinezhād and Mashāᵓi were associated with promoting ‘Iranian Islam’ (i.e., 
maktab-e Irāni). This notion coupled patriotic sentiment—occasionally lauding 
pre-Islamic Iranian glory as well as Iran’s Islamic nation—with Shiism and, in 
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rarer cases, with Mahdism.
128
 For Ahmadinezhād, ‘Iranian Islam’ meant explicitly 
Shiism, inseparable from Iran, which had played a unique role in seeking its rule 
and predominance.
129
 The challenge of ‘Iranian Islam’ lay not only in the radical 
idea, but also in that, lacking ‘formal training in Islamic jurisprudence, Mashaei 
(…) claimed to be a pioneer in ‘new Shiite teachings’ and (thereby angered) 
senior Shiite clerics’.130 Among the clerical support lost to the president in his 
new conflict with Shiite orthodoxy was that of the Ayatollahs Mesbāh-Yazdi and 
Jannati, the Guardian Council Chairman who had stood by Ahmadinezhād’s 
contested re-election in June 2009.
131
 
Both the president’s appropriation of Mahdism and his autonomous floating of 
‘Iranian Islam’ represented challenges, beyond Islamic Republican velāyat-e 
faqih theory, to the wider Osuli narrative asserting clerical leadership in post-
Occultation Shiism. The Ahmadinezhād camp’s occasionally explicit dabbling 
with anti-clericalism further alienated the Shiite clergy. For instance, 
Ahmadinezhād was reported to have ‘publicly chastised his rivals in the 
government (in September 2009) for “running to Qum for every instruction,” 
adding that “administering the country should not be left to the (Supreme) Leader, 
the religious scholars, and other (clerics)”’.132 Mashāᵓi was observed to echo these 
views.
133
 
Opinions diverge on the foreign policy effects of Ahmadinezhād’s Mahdism 
and ‘Iranian Islam’. There is some merit to the view that he and Mashāᵓi voiced ‘a 
nationalist rhetoric (challenging) the internationalist aspirations of the Islamic 
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Republic’, which ‘call for mobilization (…) of the entire umma (…) without 
regard to modern, political borders’.134 However, the contrast between 
nationalist:inward::internationalist:outward stances can be overdrawn—and in 
Ahmadinezhād’s case more than in Mashāᵓi’s. Ironically, the president was faced 
with a ‘crypto-messianic’ challenge135 by the dissident Ayatollah Kāzameyni-
Borujerdi, who advocated international harmony and objected to Iran’s 
‘antagonistic foreign policy’. His ‘stance was in sharp contrast to 
Ahmadinezhad’s rhetoric’.136 
Even Mashāᵓi’s discourse retained the vanguardist attitude towards the umma 
of the preceding foreign policy ideologues in the Islamic Republic. ‘Without Iran, 
Islam would be lost’, he declared in August 2010, and ‘if we want to present the 
truth of Islam to the world, we should raise the Iranian flag’.137 In other words, 
while his discursive interventions may be considered as a retreat from an activist 
global orientation, they remained a religious-nationalist re-articulation of Islamic 
internationalism. Shortly after Mashāᵓi gave his speech (in the same month), 
Ahmadinezhād appointed him as his ‘special envoy’ for the Middle East—the 
primary theatre of Iran’s Islamic internationalism since the revolution. This 
function was one among a range of regional missions, created by Ahmadinezhād 
allegedly to ‘improve relations hurt by the clergy’s isolationist mentality’.138 
Ahmadinezhād’s positioning of Mashāᵓi was seen as an attempt to extend the 
former’s power in the realm of foreign policy,139 and he was relatively successful 
in view of the weak record of his predecessors. (Starting his tenure with a power 
grab, he had dismissed numerous ambassadors, including the most important, and 
Author’s Accepted Manuscript © Author 
van den Bos, M. FORTHCOMING, exp. 2017. The Balance of Ecumenism and Sectarianism. Rethinking 
Religion and Foreign Policy in Iran. The Journal of Political Ideologies. 
caused Hasan Ruhāni’s resignation as Secretary of the Supreme National Security 
Council).
140
 Khāmeneᵓi and the foreign minister, Manuchehr Mottaki, objected to 
the appointment, but the president reacted only by changing Mashāᵓi’s title to that 
of ‘representative’. He remained on the offensive, spectacularly dismissing 
Mottaki in December 2010 while the latter was on a foreign mission, and as a 
replacement installing ᶜAli Akbar Sālehi—a man from his own camp.141 
Independently of the foreign ministry, Ahmadinezhād had soon developed an 
‘unprecedented foreign policy’. The tone was set in ‘a national address shortly 
after his inauguration, (in which he declared): “Our revolution’s main mission is 
to pave the way for the reappearance of the Mahdi”.’ This and similar millennial 
views were seemingly rooted in his involvement early in the revolution with the 
Hojjatiye Society.
142
 The charge of hojjatiye influence in the government, 
repeatedly heard in the early days of Ahmadinezhād’s tenure, recurred in the 
Pāsdārān newspaper Sobh-e Sādeq during heated exchanges in 2011 between the 
Revolutionary Guards, rising to the Leader’s defence, and the president.143  
Remnants of the hojjatis’ predilection for Mahdist quietism seemed to appear 
early on, when Ahmadinezhād contrasted his new line with the past policy of 
Khātami, stating that ‘today, instead of implementing “the ideology of 
development” (maktab-e toseᶜe), based on materialism and liberalism, we should 
pay attention to “the ideology of awaiting” (maktab-e entezār), and from this 
perspective we can define our domestic and foreign relations’. In terms of policy, 
Iran’s new government would ‘seriously protect that which causes the spread (…) 
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of the culture of expectation and of mahdaviyat’.144 Contrary to the quietism that 
is associated with the hojjatiye tendency, however, this millennial mindset was 
related to Ahmadinezhād’s activist ‘adventures in foreign policy’.145 
Although revolutionism was key to Ahmadinezhād’s studied pose in foreign 
affairs, the heritage of Khomeini’s ecumenism was given remarkably low profile. 
A speech in Qom in January 2006, addressing ‘a gathering composed mostly of 
Shiite clerics’146 comes close to demonstrating that Ahmadinezhād aspired to 
global Shiite leadership for Iran: ‘If we want to administer the world,’ it said, 
‘and we do have such a duty, we must (also) be able to (do so) intellectually and 
scientifically (…) Just (as) the people of Qom were (at) at the forefront in the 
revolution, (so also) they should (…) be vanguards today in providing answers to 
needs.’ Therefore, ‘we extend our hand to the elites and the ᶜolamā of Qom and 
hope that in this era, Qom (will) perform its revolutionary responsibility well’.147 
The fact that Mahdism recurs throughout Islamic history in both Sunni and 
Shiite shapes indicates that the new millennialism could have justifiably included 
ecumenist markers. The president made it clear, however, that his redeemer was 
exclusively the Twelfth Shiite Imam and omitted any transsectarian clues. Just 
like ‘Iranian Islam’, therefore, but exhibited to the world, the Mahdism of 
Ahmadinezhād was a sectarian articulation of foreign policy. Among the political 
implications, then, his messianism for the first time in the Islamic state raised an 
explicitly sectarian flag on foreign policy.
148
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There were no immediate consequences of the sectarian discourse issuing 
from the heart of the state for its foreign alliances, which initially retained the 
ecumenist–sectarian duality. If the Sunni Islamist leader Mashᶜal abhorred Shiite 
messianism, it did not show in his declaration in December 2005 that Hamas 
would defend Iran as part of ‘a unified front against the enemies of Islam’.149 By 
the end of Ahmadinezhād’s second term, however, the resurgence of sectarianism 
region-wide had put the universalist alliance under serious strain. 
In contrast, if any theme marked Khāmeneᵓi’s foreign policy focus, it was 
Islamic universalism, countering sectarianism and fostering ecumenism. Except 
for a range of political statements on Islamic unity since 2005, the Leader issued a 
notable fatwa in October 2010 prohibiting Shiites from ‘insulting any of the 
companions and wives of the Prophet, who were respected by Sunnis’. Since 
2011, furthermore, there has been a wave of ecumenist narrative on ‘Islamic 
Awakening’.150 As indicated, Al-Taqrib brings to mind that Khāmeneᵓi had called 
the Arab Spring an Islamic awakening, and that all Islamic movements needed to 
identify with ‘the existing revival so as to be a part of it in an integral (…) 
fashion’—that is, they needed to subordinate themselves to his leadership. 
Genuine Islamic leadership is argued with reference to Imam ᶜAli’s letter to Mālik 
al-Ashtar, followed by a warning that the sectarian divide is the greatest 
stumbling block for its acceptance.  
At no other time in the Islamic Republic was Iran’s publicly declared foreign 
policy so contradictory as to the balance between ecumenism and sectarianism. 
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This reflected the autonomisation of the presidency, under a wily and ambitious 
incumbent with contrary ideological inclinations, as a foreign policy centre. 
(Ironically, while it had been among the core but unrealised political ambitions of 
the reformist president Khātami to empower the presidency, it was the self-styled 
‘fundamentalist’ (osulgarā) Ahmadinezhād who—if only temporarily—
accomplished it.
151) There were two competing versions of Iran’s Shiite 
externalisation at large, the one unapologetically sectarian in advocating ‘Iranian 
Islam’ and populist Mahdism, but in the context of a transsectarian vision of an 
Iranian-led umma, wilfully ignoring the other, the main line, which was 
outwardly ecumenist but constructed around velāyat-e faqih and the core of 
clerical Shiite leadership. 
 
Conclusions 
Contrary to the many analyses of Iran’s post-revolutionary foreign policy as 
fractured, kaleidoscopic or Byzantine, the vantage point of Shiite Islamist 
ideology allows one to represent it in a systemic fashion. It has been argued in 
this article that the Islamic Republic’s state Shiite Islamism has integrated 
through hierarchisation, containing the permanent tension between its two 
dominant and contradictory frames: ecumenism and sectarianism. 
The analysis developed here has not denied utilitarian purpose to policymakers 
or material interest to the state, but allows for the argument that regime ideology 
contextualises both.
152
 One may validly perceive the Islamic Republic through the 
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lens of ideological entrepreneurs that engage in competition to arrive at an 
‘identity equilibrium’ – as has been each balance of ecumenism and sectarianism, 
but consistently within the bounds of Shiite Islamism.
153
 Even causes célèbres of 
‘secular’ raison d’état in the Islamic Republic – Chechen Muslims abandoned to 
waves of Russian punishment and the support for Christian Armenia against 
Muslim-majority Azerbaijan – align with Iran’s dominant foreign policy doctrine 
of omm ol-qorā, which delineates Shiite state interest.154 
Shiite Islamism alternated fore- and background in ecumenic and sectarian 
variants across the revolutionary decade (1979–1989), the reformist interlude 
(1989–2005) and the era of radical reassertion (2005–2013). Iran’s constitution 
anchors a paradox of Islamic universalism in the sectarian frames containing 
Khomeini’s transsectarian message. In the revolutionary period, universalist 
policy had sectarian drivers evident in the imagery and aims of the war with Iraq 
and, especially, in the Shiite nature of Iran’s foreign alliances.155  
The balance shifted towards sectarianism in the reformist era, as seen in the 
open coexistence of two leadership organisations, for taqrib and the ahl-e beyt, 
with relatively more ecumenic and sectarian remits. These moderated 
articulations of Shiite universalism encompassed Sunni rapprochement within a 
religiously defined hierarchy of Shiite guidance and placed ecumenical Shiite 
leadership at the helm in the umma’s global struggle. Similar rebalancing was 
evident in the emergence of religious nationalism, with continued inter- or 
transnationalist articulations of key foreign policy perspectives. Religious 
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nationalism in the shape of omm ol-qorā theory was not in principle at odds with 
Islamic universalism, but reprioritised Shiite Iran tactically. Moreover, just like 
ecumenic Islamic universalism, the new religious nationalism retained Shiite 
clerical authority at its core. 
Finally, in the era of radical reassertion, with clashes between presidency and 
leadership, both ecumenist and sectarian concepts came to the fore, unravelling 
hierarchical integration in the balance of ecumenism and sectarianism. Shiite 
Islamism resurfaced in two contending foreign policy frames—each in itself a 
particular ecumenist and sectarian hierarchy. The ‘Iranian Islam’ and populist 
Mahdism of one was boldly sectarian, though mobilised for a transsectarian 
umma, while the other, the main tendency to date, was committed to an Islamic 
ecumene but anchored in clerical Shiite authority.  
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 Ibid., pp. 317, 318, 320; cf. Louër, Transnational Shia Politics, op. cit., Ref. 25, pp. 
232-233. 
32
 Y. Talhami, 'The Fatwas and the Nusayri/Alawis of Syria', Middle Eastern Studies, 2 
(2010), p. 191. 
33
 P. G. Pinto, 'Pilgrimage, Commodities, and Religious Objectification: The Making of 
Transnational Shiism between Iran and Syria', Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa 
and the Middle East, 1 (2007), p. 112; cf. Louër, Transnational Shia Politics, op. cit., Ref. 
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Ref. 25, p. 167). Hādi al-Modarresi, heading the Islamic Front for the Liberation of 
Bahrain, and his brother Hojjatoleslām Mohammad-Taqi, who reputedly led AIRAP, and 
in various guises in Iraq, Kuwait and Iran, the Islamic Action Organization, ‘became the 
main brokers of the [export] of the Islamic revolution to the Gulf monarchies’ (ibid., p. 
164). 
42
 Kostiner, 'Shiʻi Unrest', op. cit., Ref. 17, p. 183. 
43 
A precursor in name of the IAO, the Message Movement (al-Haraka al-risāliyya), 
headed by Mohammad-Taqi al-Modarresi, spread ‘from the mid-1970s onwards’ in Saudi 
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